Neighborhood Sectarian Displacement and the Battle for Baghdad: A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of Fear and Crimes Against Humanity in Iraq[1]

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We use two unique Iraq data sets to show how fear and uncertainty served to motivate the self-fulfilling, neighborhood-specific forces that followed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Sectarian criminal violence by armed Shia and Sunni organizations created a situation of ethnic/religious cleansing that reconfigured much of Baghdad. The article focuses on the case of how one particularly violent group, the Mahdi Army, mobilized through the coercive entrepreneurship of Muqtada al-Sadr, used organized crime tactics of killing, torture, rape, kidnapping, harassment, threats, and forced displacement in a widespread and systematic attack against civilians that forced Sunni residents from their Baghdad neighborhoods. Ordinary Iraqis were victims of an amplified "self-fulfilling prophecy of fear" that created the momentum for massive sectarian displacement in the battle for Baghdad. We demonstrate that there is a neighborhood specific effect of early postinvasion neighborhood fear net of intervening violence on displacement three years later, following the Al-Qaeda Samara Shrine attack, confirming an effect of a self-fulfilling prophecy of fear in the neighborhoods of Baghdad that compounded in a self-reinforcing way. The changed demography of Baghdad was effectively consolidated by the later surge of U.S. forces that left in place the territorial gains made by the Shia-led Mahdi Army at the expense of former Sunni residents. We conclude that this continues to matter because the resulting grievances have contributed to renewed violence.

KEY WORDS: ethnicity; human rights; neighborhoods; religion; violence; war.

INTRODUCTION

Baghdad is home to over seven million people and it is the nation's administrative and economic center. Traditionally, it hosted a population that mirrored the nation's diversity. However, by the time of the U.S. invasion, the most politically acute sectarian divisions in Baghdad were between Arab Shia and Sunni groups, with some neighborhoods defined as largely Shia, largely Sunni, and mixed Sunni and Shia.[6]

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[6] While some traditional Baghdad ethnic-religious populations fled the country *en masse* in the 1960s in response to state repressive policies directed against them (Batau), in 2003, Baghdad remained a very diverse city with large populations of Kurds and Christians and other ethnic groups. While members of these groups were systematically targeted for violence and abuse, none set up highly organized armed movements as did multiple groups of Arab Sunni and Arab Shia.

Although the regime of Saddam Hussein and the governing Baath Party plunged the nation into a devastating war with Iran in the 1980s, isolating the country internationally and later leading to sanctions, the state retained complete control. The autocratic Hussein government kept order in Baghdad, creating a city in which conventional crime was rare and where there was only one significant social force: the state. When the government of Saddam Hussein fell, the administrative structure of Iraq's centrally managed society collapsed, leaving Iraqis justifiably anxious about their future.

Even the invading U.S. soldiers saw brewing elements of these divisions, as evidenced during the famous tearing down of the statue of Saddam in Baghdad's Firdos Square. Observers (e.g., Allawi 2007:133–134; Shadid 2005:149–150) sensed ambivalence among the Iraqi onlookers that expressed their fears about looming chaos. Yet, we know little empirically about *how* this fear was socially constructed and the *mechanisms* by which it would profoundly change the social composition of Baghdad's neighborhoods—in ways unanticipated by the Bush administration. The thesis of this article is that this fear, born of uncertainty, amplified by historical context, and provoked by the invasion and the loss of institutional control in the chaotic aftermath, propelled a self-reinforcing and self-fulfilling sectarian process.

NIGHT DRAWS NEAR

Journalists contributed to growing fear in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq. For example, Judith Miller's (2001) front-page *New York Times* story claimed that there were "secret facilities for biological, chemical and nuclear weapons [located] in underground wells, private villas and under Saddam Hussein Hospital in Baghdad." This story falsely corroborated fears of Saddam Hussein's "unwillingness to stop making weapons of mass destruction."

Such reporting is suggestive of Merton's (1936:901) useful distinction between present and future foreseeable consequences that follow from the "imperious immediacy of interest": when a decision maker is so absorbed with the intended goals of an action that the unintended consequences are purposefully ignored. The U.S.-led invasion failed to carefully consider the basic structure of Iraqi society—particularly its deep ethnic and religious divides. Given costs in the trillions (on U.S. costs, see Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008; on Iraq costs, see Hagan, Kaiser, and Rothenberg 2012), thousands of U.S./coalition military deaths (Fischer 2010) and hundreds of thousands of Iraqi deaths (Burkle and Garfield 2013), there is need for sociological reflection on what occurred.

Despite the dominance of a pro-invasion perspective within the media—the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* later apologized[7] —there were countervailing voices. One voice was Arab-American journalist Anthony Shadid (2005) who wrote in the *Post* and *Times* about fears of ordinary Iraqis, followed by his important book *As Night Draws Near*. Shadid (2005:425) used the Arabic word *ghamidh* to express this mood of apprehension and metaphorically remarked that

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[7] http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/26/international/middleeast/26FTE_NOTE.html

"Night always seemed to be drawing near in Iraq, and now [in the first years of the occupation] the chaos and the sense of the unknown seemed to generate their own momentum."

Shadid (2005:426) described this momentum as driven by a "logic of violence." Shadid's work thus chronicled the uncertainty and fear that Iraqis felt *before* the country fell into a state of devastating violence. Shadid documented ordinary Iraqis' worries about a future lacking a strong, unifying state, combined with easy access to weapons, in a contested region (with two neighbors invaded by Iraq), and occupied by a foreign army that dismantled systems of control. Iraqis worried, wouldn't multiple armed forces emerge to compete for power?

As we explain below, the anticipation of conflict for control between rival armed groups in Iraq suggests Tilly's (1985, 2003) theory of state-making as organized crime and Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) opportunity theory of crime. These theories direct attention to foreseeable consequences of collective criminal behavior that involves both opportunistic and coordinated violence. We apply concepts drawn from these theories to explore—through a case study—one element of the sectarian violence: the rise of Shia-organized violence involving the Mahdi Army in a sequence of harassment and threats leading, especially during the 2006 peak in violence, to widespread and systematic displacement of Sunnis in what we term the battle for Baghdad.

We assess a Mertonian hypothesis about unanticipated consequences, namely that ordinary Iraqis were victims of an amplified "self-fulfilling prophecy of fear" which was a driving source of displacement in Baghdad. Merton (1957:477) illustrated the concept of the self-fulfilling prophecy with the parable of fear and ensuing panic among customers who join in a run on a bank. The customers' fears about the solvency of the bank might have some objective foundation, but Merton explains that "the parable tells us that public definition of a situation (prophecies or predictions) become an integral part of the situation and thus affect subsequent developments." He indicated that the influence of these prophecies is "peculiar to human affairs" and he significantly added (Merton 1948:210) that "the self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby fears are translated into reality, operates only in the absence of deliberate institutional controls." American forces conspicuously failed after the invasion to establish institutional controls in Iraq.

This presents a corollary conceptualization to the Bush administration's justification of the U.S. invasion of Iraq—with its claim that it was "preempting" the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. Iraqis fearfully anticipated the dangerous consequences of the invasion, considering that it might lead to the sort of sectarian conflict that later engulfed the nation, and we show how this fear had predictable *neighborhood-specific* consequences that American decision makers either failed to anticipate or chose to ignore.

ORGANIZED OPPORTUNISTIC AND COORDINATED CRIME

Regime change in Iraq required remaking the state. Charles Tilly's (1985, 2003) insight was that state-making is often the product of organized criminal activity. He

argued state creation frequently involves "coercive entrepreneurship" based on organized criminal threats and protection. He explained that state makers often create threats and then provide protection to build power and capital. This entrepreneurship uses "opportunistic violence" and "coordinated destruction" to expand territory, which Tilly called "boundary activation." Opportunistic violence and coordinated destruction activates boundaries not only by expanding rule over people and territory, but by killing and displacing people. State-making therefore often involves collectively organized crimes leading to widespread and systematic death and displacement.

Tilly's perspective paralleled Cloward and Ohlin's opportunity theory of crime, with organized crime as the link. Cloward and Ohlin articulated how organized criminals infiltrated state law-enforcement organizations and joined legitimate and illegitimate opportunity structures to facilitate state-protected criminal enterprise. They explained how groups lacking legitimate opportunities responded to their sense of injustice by seeking opportunities for state-protected organized crime.

In this article, we indirectly assess Tilly and Cloward and Ohlin's ideas about state-making and opportunity structures with a case study tracing the sequence of the rise of the Arab Shia "Mahdi Army." This militant organization was founded by Muqtada al-Sadr, a young cleric who became rapidly influential in the postinvasion context. The Mahdi Army began as a social movement providing social services and voicing Arab Shia political concerns, but it ultimately turned to violence, using threats, harassment, extortion, and kidnapping as well as killing and rape to force mass displacement of Arab Sunnis and others. The Mahdi Army's crimes provided substantive benefits and a form of employment for Arab Shia youth with limited economic opportunities (Hashim 2006; International Crisis Group 2006). In time, the Mahdi Army and Muqtada al-Sadr took on a substantive role in legitimate political activities and gained control of key government ministries (International Crisis Group 2008).

We empirically assess the mechanisms of this kind of transformation identified by both Tilly and Cloward and Ohlin. Thus we empirically observe in the Iraq context how the use of harassment and threats by the Mahdi Army against the lives and property of Sunni households led the latter victims to flee their neighborhoods, simultaneously serving the boundary-expanding territorial goals of a collective movement and providing opportunities for economic and political gain by the perpetrators. Green and Ward (2009:3) call this "dual purpose violence." It is important to note that other armed groups engaged in similar tactics of brutal violence. However, focusing on the case of the Mahdi Army provides an especially cogent means of documenting and analyzing the complex relations between fear, violence, criminal activity, and the restructuring of politics in postinvasion Iraq.

Cloward and Ohlin's theory describes the perceived economic injustice that can motivate and organize such criminal tactics, while Tilly's theory predicts how such criminal mechanisms can be used for purposes of boundary activation and collectively organized goals. We will see below how the targeted harassment and threats anticipated in the above theories and used by the Mahdi Army against Sunni victims in Baghdad played an essential mediating role amplifying a Mertonian self-fulfilling prophecy of fear that depicts and explains the unanticipated effects of

the sectarian fear that was preemptively provoked by the U.S. invasion and occupation.

THE SHIA–SUNNI CONFLICT IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haddad (2011; see also Jabar 2003) argues that it is essential to recognize how a motivating sense of victimization evolved in both Sunni and Shia communities. Haddad calls sectarianism Iraq's "skeleton in the closet," while emphasizing that the terms *Shia* and *Sunni* were seldom publically used in Iraq before the 1990s. Events in the 1990s and following the first Gulf War provoked a new sense of victimization and identity among both Shia and Sunni groups. A Shia sense of victimhood followed from the brutal repression of Shia individuals and groups by Saddam in southern Iraq following the first Gulf War, while the Sunnis also felt victimized by the intensifying international sanctions that followed this war and that devastated civilian life in Saddam's state-based command economy.

For the American strategists, among the least understood elements of Iraqi society were the deep feelings of both resentment and political possibility within elements of the Arab Shia that compose the majority of the nation's population overall and especially in the provinces of the center and south. Perhaps the most important example of this involved the unanticipated rise into public view of Muqtada al-Sadr as leader of the only truly new mass movement in postinvasion Iraq—and the development of the Mahdi Army (Cockburn 2008:13). As we further explain below, in Tilly's terms, Muqtada al-Sadr was a coercive entrepreneur.

Muqtada al-Sadr was born to an influential family of Shia clerics, including his father, Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, and his father's cousin Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. Baqir, in particular, developed a politically oriented strain of Shia faith that challenged the government of Saddam Hussein, who had him killed with hundreds of his supporters in 1980, after the revolution in Iran. Muhammad Sadiq gained similar importance in the 1990s, after the systematic brutal repression of the unsuccessful popular uprising in the south following the first Gulf War involving key Shia leaders. In 1999, the assassination of Sadiq and two of his sons by Iraqi government agents led to mass protests (Cochrane 2008; Cockburn 2008; Cole 2003; International Crisis Group 2006).

The followers of the Sadrist movement were young, uneducated, and intensely religious, with the kinds of feelings of injustice emphasized by Cloward and Ohlin. U.S. policy makers might have expected the aggrieved followers of al-Sadr as well as other Shia to support the American vision of rebuilding Iraq following the invasion. However, this vague hope ignored the acute sense of betrayal felt by virtually all Shia movements dating from the 1991 Gulf War, when President George H. W. Bush encouraged a broad-based uprising in southern Iraq and then withheld critical support. The mass uprising was at first successful. Yet, when the United States did not provide military backing, Saddam Hussein's most loyal army units regrouped, took back southern Iraq, and engaged in vicious reprisals. The Baath regime's

counterinsurgency slogan on its advancing tanks boasted "There will be no Shia after today" (Allawi 2007:49).

After the Shia insurgency failed, Saddam Hussein engaged in ongoing and systematic repression of all Shia movements. Muqtada al-Sadr inherited an angry, underground, and youth-dominated Shia movement that was subjected to constant surveillance and reprisals.

The U.S.-led 2003 invasion and resulting chaotic occupation unleashed latent conflicting forces. Kalyvas and Kocher (2007:185) emphasize that key decisions made during the U.S.-led coalition's invasion and occupation explain why sectarian conflict in Iraq emerged so violently. In what Dodge (2012) calls an "exclusive elite bargain," the coalition's early decisions gave greater influence to parts of the formerly exiled Shia opposition groups and leaders, while deconstructing Iraq's last remaining national and ethnically inclusive institutions—the government ministries, the army, and the Baath Party.

Iraq was in a state of chaos following the U.S. invasion. The U.S. failure to take responsibility for basic social order allowed some disaffected Sunni-led groups to adopt Al-Qaeda tactics, including bombings of Shia mosques and markets. This intensified the Sadrists' anger and suggested that their own safety, protection, and political viability required marshaling their own armed militias. After a U.S. helicopter knocked over a religious banner in Sadr City in August 2003, and then again when Al-Qaeda bombed Shia mosques in Karbala and Kadhimiya in March 2004, the Sadrist movement grew with a momentum that amplified the fears of ordinary Iraqis (Cochrane 2008; Cockburn 2008; International Crisis Group 2006; Rosen 2010).

Muqtada al-Sadr announced formation of the Mahdi Army after the invasion and soon claimed more than 10,000 recruits (Cockburn 2008; Rosen 2010). Shadid (2006:435) reports that by 2004 the Mahdi Army had assumed "an elaborate hierarchy and formidable organization." Rosen (2010:65) similarly observes that "the Mahdi Army...became more organized and hierarchical." In Cloward and Ohlin's terms, the Mahdi Army provided an organized illegitimate opportunity structure for young, underemployed Shia men. The Mahdi Army also infiltrated and formed alliances with national and local police forces (Allawi 2007:422). From Cloward and Ohlin's and Tilly's perspectives, this linked and mobilized legitimate and illegitimate opportunity structures in organized criminal state-making.

Shadid (2006:437) reported that the militia began to act as "the long dreaded arm of the movement," sending out death threats and intimidating neighborhood residents. In April 2004, after U.S. Special Forces detained one of his leading lieutenants, Muqtada seemed to cross a line by urging his followers to "Terrorize your enemy." Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, responded by calling Muqtada an "outlaw."

By 2005, the Sadrists and the Mahdi Army had initiated a sectarian cleansing of Baghdad's Sunni and mixed neighborhoods. They openly carried weapons in defiance of the U.S. military and harassed Sunni residents with letters threatening households and demanding protection money with warnings of violent reprisals.

Tilly's boundary-activation process set in and the dominant demography of Baghdad's neighborhoods began shifting from Sunni to Shia.

By 2005, efforts to rebuild the Iraqi state's security forces were nearly entirely controlled by Shia political parties who recruited young Shia men. The International Crisis Group (2007) reported that "poor Shiites filled the ranks of the security forces.... " Rosen (2010:60) explained that "the interior ministry had been given to Shiites.... Most poor young Shiite men supported Muqtada, so it followed that the security forces fell under the control of Sadrists and their Mahdi Army." While the American military saw 2006 as the year of the police, Rosen (2010:234) reported that "[i]nstead it was the year the police and the Mahdi Army became one."

The 2006 Al-Qaeda attack on the al-Askari Shia shrine in Samarra inflamed the Shia–Sunni divide. As the violence peaked, Nuri al-Maliki, the Shia leader of the formerly exiled Dawa party, who rose through the de-Baathification Commission and was thus recognized as a menacing threat by Sunni Baathists, was selected as prime minister in a U.S.-negotiated process.[8] By the end of 2006, the Mahdi Army had prevailed in the battle for Baghdad's neighborhoods; it had gained sectarian dominance over the previously advantaged Sunni in multiple areas of the capital city. The majority of Baghdad's neighborhoods were mixed in 2003, but by 2008 these neighborhoods were "unmixed" and Shia occupied (see discussion of Fig. 2 below). Yet Muqtada's legitimacy and control over his forces was simultaneously diminished. Bodies piled up on the streets of Baghdad. In late August 2007, Muqtada declared a six-month *tajmid*—or freeze—on operations of the Mahdi Army (Farrell 2007).

The effects of the freeze and the beginning of the drawdown of U.S. surge troops largely left the recently reconfigured neighborhoods of Baghdad in place. The local and federal governments were in Shia hands, and the neighborhoods increasingly were, too. Figure 2 shows the increase in Shia neighborhoods from 2003 to 2008. The maps in Fig. 2 are reconfigured from the work of Michael Izady (http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml) and overlaid with the data on threats and harassment that we further analyze below. The upper left and lower right maps most clearly show that while the majority of Baghdad's neighborhoods were mixed in 2003, by 2008 these neighborhoods were "unmixed" and Shia occupied. The upper right and lower left maps show concentrations of harassment and threats with dots and a quartile ranking in size of circles of the neighborhoods where the largest numbers of displacements occurred.

ANTICIPATION AND AMPLIFICATION OF THE SHIA–SUNNI CONFLICT

The sense of victimization and victimhood following the first Gulf War and the imposition of sanctions contributed to the fearful foreboding during the invasion described by Anthony Shadid (2005). The uncertainty created by the invasion and the ensuing chaos solidified these fears. Our question is

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[8] Al-Maliki was selected as prime minister on April 22, 2006, after Ibrahim Al-Jaafari was forced from office. Al-Jaafari had been selected as prime minister following the contentious elections of January 2005.

whether there was a neighborhood-specific connection, and if so, of what form, between this fearful sense of foreboding and displacement during the battle for Baghdad.

Our key hypothesis is that ordinary citizens of Baghdad's neighborhoods were victims of a Mertonian "self-fulfilling prophecy of fear" that intensified displacement. We hypothesize that this prophecy involved fearful anticipations of civil strife compounded in amplified and self-reinforcing ways that led to devastating cycles of violence (Brubaker and Laitin 1998). Hadadd (2011:113) observes that the Sadrists' rhetoric propelled Shia identity into an "assertive sectarianism," fostering a sense of threat "amongst the other" who resorted to counter assertions further feeding a "spiraling series of assertions of antagonistic group identities" (p. 184).

Quillian and Pager (2010) make an important point about the sociological literature on the fear of crime. They note this literature conflates objective risks with subjectively perceived consequences of victimization (see also Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Roundtree and Land 1996; Warr and Stafford 1983). Subjective perceptions can provoke amplified expectations of victimization. We empirically distinguish these two fearful processes in postinvasion Baghdad by identifying Iraqis' objective "historical anticipation" and their subsequent subjective "expectation amplification" of victimization risk.

Our use of the concepts of "historical anticipation" and "expectation amplification" builds from Quillian and Pager's (2010) American work on statistical discrimination and stereotype amplification. Quillian and Pager use the term *statistical discrimination* to explain how historical relationships between social conditions and crime justify the use of group-level social characteristics in anticipating risks of crime victimization. Beyond this, stereotype amplification refers to cultural sources of distortion that inflate perceived victimization risks. We refer in Iraq to related processes of "historical anticipation" and "expectation amplification."

The historically based anticipation we consider is the process by which ordinary Iraqis accurately foresaw looming conflicts and the neighborhoods where victimization risks would be highest. Given the growing chaos in Baghdad, and their knowledge and observations, ordinary Iraqis gauged for their own neighborhoods the potential for problems to occur. Yet Quillian and Pager's argument is that the prescience of such empirically based predictions also feeds into cognitive stereotyping. The importance of Quillian and Pager's perspective on statistical discrimination and stereotype amplification is the implication that exaggerated stereotypes often add a Mertonian self-fulfilling momentum to fearful perceptions of risk. In the Shia–Sunni conflict, we call these neighborhood momentum-building perceptions "amplified expectations."

We summarize in Fig. 1 the hypothesized processes of historical anticipation and expectation amplification that emerged within Baghdad neighborhoods. This displacement model begins with the sectarian conflict. This is the backdrop of the everyday fears in Baghdad neighborhoods following the invasion in 2003. These fears were initially real but inchoate, as suggested by Shadid's book title, *Night Draws Near*, and his reference to *ghamid*. We measure neighborhood specific fears

below using a Gallup Poll (GP) of Baghdad in 2003. The remainder of the model uses the Iraq History Project Current Violations Initiative (CVI) conducted in 2007 and 2008. This survey asked respondents if and when since the invasion they had experienced human-rights violations and crimes, including harassment and threats leading to displacement.

The model presented in Fig. 1 includes historical anticipation as an arrow at the center left indicating an indirect neighborhood-specific process leading to household displacement. This indirect process flows through experiences of Sunni respondents being victimized by Mahdi Army perpetrators with harassment and threats. We refer to this indirect effect as the cognitive product of historical anticipation. In addition, the model includes a horizontal arrow at the top of the figure indicating a further neighborhood-specific direct effect. This direct effect is net of all other variables and is interpreted as indicating amplified expectations involved in a self-fulfilling prophecy of fear that also led to neighborhood displacement.

A final part of the arrow at the top right of Fig. 1 indicates an expected peak in the effects of 2003 postinvasion neighborhood-specific fears three years later, following the 2006 attack on the Samarra Shrine. The effects in this model of historical anticipation and expectation amplification combine to create a Mertonian self-fulfilling prophecy of fear leading to widespread and systematic displacement of individuals from neighborhoods. In Tilly and Cloward and Ohlin terms, the harassment and threats were organized crime tactics of domination and displacement used to establish Shia rule in Baghdad.

LINKING TWO DATA SETS

We draw on two studies: the 2003 Gallup Poll (GP) of Baghdad and the 2003–2008 Iraq History Project's Current Violations Initiative (CVI). Gallup conducted 1,178 interviews six months after the invasion in a probability-based household


Fig. 1. Historical anticipation and amplified expectations of fear in Iraq, *circa* 2003 through 2008.

cluster design with a more than 90% response rate. The CVI interviews were con-
ducted in 2007–2008 with 1,929 victims of human-rights violations in 2003–2008,
about half of whom were from Baghdad and are the focus of this research. Our
linkage of household survey and nongovernmental human-rights data to analyze
neighborhood variation in displacement in Baghdad is analogous to Kirk and
Papachristos's (2011) combination of survey with government crime data to study
homicide in Chicago.

    The majority of the CVI victims were displaced and therefore unrepresented in
GP. CVI sampled purposively: through contacts with victims' groups (e.g., political
prisoners associations), local nongovernmental organizations, displacement camps,
and interviewers' tribal and family affiliations. Although nonrandom, CVI's purpo-
sive sampling was essential to representing victims of human-rights crimes during a
violent and chaotic period in Baghdad. The challenge was to join the respective
methodological strengths of GP and CVI for our purposes.

    We first identified and matched respondents' neighborhood locations in the
two studies. CVI interviewers recorded respondents' neighborhoods, and we
acquired a GP neighborhood identifier. We then used a U.S. military satellite image
of a grid-like boundary map and the *Baghdad-Districts and Neighborhoods* map
(Humanitarian Information Centre for Iraq 2003) to link GP neighborhood identifi-
ers and CVI locations. Despite missing data, we located 805 of 1,028 respondents
among the Baghdad portion of CVI, and 1,112 of 1,178 respondents in GP.

    We drew before- and after-invasion measures of fear from the 1,112 GP
respondents in 25 Baghdad neighborhood clusters (see Fig. 2), and measures
involving human-rights violations in these neighborhoods experienced by 774 of the
805 CVI respondents. Both GP and CVI asked about victimization by forms of
assault, burglary, and theft. For comparison, we initially limited CVI's coverage to
the early postinvasion years. We created a GP/CVI study-by-neighborhoods cross-
tabulation of numbers of respondents reporting crime index violations.[9] Table I
summarizes results based on GP/CVI comparisons for 2003–2004 and 2003–2005.

    Our hypothesis is that if the GP and CVI samples are both representative of
the victimized population of Baghdad, their distributions should only become sig-
nificantly different in the later years (i.e., beginning in 2005) when the CVI sample
began to include many displaced respondents not included in the GP residential-
household sample. In the earlier years, when displaced respondents are excluded
from the CVI sample, the neighborhood distributions of index crimes should not be
significantly different if the samples are similarly representative. As predicted, the
GP/CVI distributions of victimization are only significantly different when we
include both victims of displacement and 2005 respondents.

    There nonetheless remains the question of how selection of victims into the
CVI survey during the later years might impact on our analysis. To further address
this question, we treated inclusion in CVI as contrasted with the general population
represented by GP as a potential source of sample selection bias. Selection into CVI

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[9] While CVI included measures of gender, ethnicity, and other demographic characteristics, GP did not
   include any measures of victims' characteristics beyond their family's location. Thus the unique way of
   comparing the two data sets' distributions of victims is through their neighborhood and district within
   Baghdad.

Fig. 2. Sectarian makeup of Baghdad 2003–2008.

Table I. Comparison Between GP and CVI Data Sets of Index-Crime Distribution Across Baghdad Neighborhoods

| | | Pearson's Chi-Square | | | Fisher's Exact Test | |
		Value	Degrees of Freedom	Significance	Significance	N
All Victims	2003–2004	37.3864	32	0.275	0.225	105
	2003–2005	63.6822	34	0.002	0.000	166
Excluding	2003–2004	32.7778	31	0.380	0.533	80
Displaced Persons	2003–2005	39.0020	32	0.184	0.184	92

depended on respondents self-identifying as human-rights victims and being accessible to interviewers.

We first created a sample-selection probit equation with inclusion in CVI as contrasted with GP the outcome, and with locations of respondents in Baghdad neighborhoods prior to the invasion as the predictors. We treated Sadr City as the omitted reference because this neighborhood was widely regarded as having the lowest levels of resident victimization following the invasion (e.g., Hagan et al. 2012). Muqtada al-Sadr maintained a level of control inside this densely populated neighborhood by asking police to return to their stations and to restore and

maintain order. His people guarded mosques, manned checkpoints, and provided social assistance to those in great need (Cockburn 2008).

As expected, the selection equation revealed more victims were selected by interviewers for the CVI sample in almost all of the other neighborhoods compared to Sadr City. We created a sample-selection variable, λ, from the results of this equation and then added it to the final models estimated in a table on file with the journal. As expected, there were only relatively modest substantive differences between the unadjusted and adjusted results in this table. Thus the most important estimate for our argument involves the effect on displacement of the cross-level interaction between fear after the invasion and the 2006 Samarra Shrine attack, and the unadjusted and adjusted effect estimates are nearly identical.[10]

THE GALLUP POLL IN BAGHDAD

The American-led invasion of Iraq began in March 2003 and Gallup conducted its interviews in August and September. Using a measure that invokes the metaphor for Shadid's book, *Night Draws Near*, GP asked respondents to report fear about going out at night in their neighborhoods during the last month (August 2003), during the month before that, since the invasion (in March 2003), and before the invasion. We created two variables from the responses. The first variable is a binary measure of the fear of going out in the neighborhood at night *before* the invasion. The second variable is a four-value measure of fear of going out in the neighborhood *since* the invasion at monthly intervals. We aggregated these GP measures to form a contextual indicator of neighborhood specific pre- and postinvasion fear that could be applied with the individual victimization measured by CVI.

These geographically based measures allow us to conduct a change-score analysis of effects of preinvasion and early postinvasion neighborhood fear. We are particularly interested in the extent to which this neighborhood-based fear is predictive of *later* displacement, *net* of the intervening historically grounded anticipation. We argue that a net *direct* effect of neighborhood fear in 2003 reflects the prominent influence of what we have called the "amplified expectations" of a self-fulfilling prophecy of fear as collective cognitive products and leading to displacement.

THE IRAQ HISTORY PROJECT'S CURRENT VIOLATIONS INITIATIVE

The CVI uniquely addresses the full range of human-rights crimes in postinvasion Iraq—such as displacement, killings, assassinations, indiscriminant attacks, abductions, torture, threats, detentions, and other abuses—by a variety of armed factions, including U.S.-led coalition forces, Iraqi government forces, Al-Qaeda, and various Sunni, Shia, and other militias.

The CVI interviews charted processes leading to displacement diagramed in Fig. 1 and dated when the violations began. The respondents identified themselves

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[10] The final trimmed model estimates (3.931) and the comparable selection adjusted estimate (3.996) differ by .065.

as members of Shia, Sunni, and other groups, and they identified perpetrators in these attacks, which most frequently involved Mahdi Army assailants, followed by Al-Qaeda of Mesopotamia and U.S. military forces. They described harassment—including indiscriminant stops and detentions—and threats, which often involved demands for money for protection against blackmail and killings.

The process diagramed in the interior box of Fig. 1 unfolded over the five years (2003–2008) addressed by the interviews. To the extent that the displacement process is anticipated in the early postinvasion neighborhood-specific fears and ensuing experiences of harassment and threats by ordinary Iraqis reported in our analysis of the GP and CVI data, we will refer to it as the collective cognitive product of an objective neighborhood-based process of historical anticipation. To the extent that there is a net direct effect of the early postinvasion neighborhood fear that exceeds the indirect harassment and threat process that links these fears to later displacement in Fig. 1, we will refer to it as the collective, cognitive product of neighborhood-based amplified expectations leading to the self-fulfilling prophecy of fear.

METHODS

Descriptive statistics summarizing individual and neighborhood data from GP and CVI are presented in Table II. All of the individual-level data come from CVI. Males (75%) were much more likely to be the respondents in the CVI interviews who reported the familial experience, reflecting the patriarchal character of Iraq society. More than a third of the self-identified victims were Sunni (40%), while about a quarter of the victims self-identified as being from other non-Shia groups (24%); we treat Shia victims (36%) as the omitted comparison group. About two-thirds of the respondents (63%) reported they were currently employed. Although respondents identified more than 20 perpetrator groups, the most frequently identified was the Shia Mahdi Army (33%), followed by Al-Qaeda of Mesopotamia (13%), and U.S. military forces (10%). We combined all other perpetrators as the omitted reference group. We also include an individual-level report of attacks in 2006 (35%). Finally, we include reports of killings of household members (56%), as well as harassment (35%) and threats (59%).

Neighborhood-level measures were drawn from several sources. The 2003 sectarian identification of the Baghdad neighborhoods is derived from maps developed by Michael Izady (see above). The majority of neighborhoods were mixed in sectarian identity before they were "unmixed" by displacement. In 2003, about a fifth of the neighborhoods (20%) were clearly majority Sunni, more than three-quarters were mixed (80%), and just over 10% (12%) were Shia—again, the comparison category. By 2008, there was a demonstrable shift to Shia-majority neighborhoods, displayed in Fig. 2.

Fear of going out at night in the neighborhoods before and since the invasion was measured in GP, as indicated above. Only 6% of the GP respondents reported being fearful of going out in their own neighborhood at night before the invasion

Table II. Descriptive Statistics for Individual and Neighborhood Characteristics, Baghdad Gallup Poll (2003) and Current Violations Initiative (2004–2008)

Variables	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Outcome (CVI)				
Displaced (Displaced = 1)	.81	.39	0	1
Individuals (CVI)				
Gender (Male = 1)	.75	.43	0	1
Victim Self-Identification				
Sunni	.40	.49	0	1
Non-Shia Others (Shia Reference Group)	.24	.43	0	1
Employment (Employed = 1)	.63	.48	0	1
Perpetrator Identification				
Al-Qaeda	.13	.34	0	1
Mahdi Army	.33	.47	0	1
U.S. Forces (Other Perpetrators Reference Group)	.10	.31	0	1
2006 Attacks	.35	.48	0	1
Killings (Household Member = 1)	.56	.50	0	1
Harassment (Harassed = 1)	.35	.50	0	1
Threats (Threatened = 1)	.59	.49	0	1
Neighborhoods (CVI + Gallup)				
Neighborhood Identity				
Sunni (Sunni = 1)	.20	.41	0	1
Mixed (Mixed = 1) (Shia Reference Group)	.68	.48	0	1
Fear at Night After Invasion (Gallup)	.96	.09	.79	1.18
Fear at Night Before Invasion (Gallup)	.06	.05	.00	.15
Killings (CVI)	.55	.13	.36	.78
Harassment (CVI)	.35	.08	.17	.50
Threats (CVI)	.50	.65	.40	.93

n = 764 individuals; *N* = 25 neighborhoods.

(see also Chehab 2005:98). Many more respondents were fearful since the invasion, with the average neighborhood scoring .96 on the 0–3 scale of fear described above. Finally, we aggregated the CVI reports of killings, harassment, and threats by neighborhoods to consider their effects.

We use multilevel models (Raudenbush et al. 2004) to consider the process of displacement. Because displacement is a binary outcome, we estimate a multilevel model using the Bernoulli sampling distribution and the logit link function:

$$\eta_{ij} = \log[\varphi_{ij}/(1 - \varphi_{ij})]$$

where η_{ij} is the log of the odds and φ_{ij} is the probability of being displaced.

We argue that to the extent there is a neighborhood-specific effect of early postinvasion neighborhood fear that exceeds the indirect processes of historical anticipation linking this fear to later displacement (Fig. 1), this influence of neighborhood fear can be understood as the result of a process of expectation amplification—that is, as the predicted result of a prophecy of fear compounding in a self-fulfilling way. Measurement of this net prophetic effect in a data set separate from the measurement of displacement, with a predicted cross-level peak in the year of the Samara Shrine attack, is a strong test of the self-fulfilling neighborhood effect of fear.

RESULTS

Table III presents the log-odds of human-rights victims in Baghdad experiencing harassment and threats that we proposed in Fig. 1 were mediators of the process of displacement. This table considers the fearful historical anticipation of Sunni residents of Baghdad that they were at heightened risk soon after the invasion. If this effect is observed, it suggests that the Sunni anticipated looming consequences of the growing chaos in Baghdad.

As expected, the first column in Table III reveals the Mahdi Army militia as primary perpetrators of harassment against Sunni victims in the Sunni and mixed neighborhoods of Baghdad. However, the Mahdi Army militia did not act alone—Al-Qaeda of Mesopotamia and U.S. Army forces were also significantly involved.

Compared to other perpetrator groups, the expected odds of harassment at the hands of the Mahdi Army were 2.13 ($e^{.785}$) higher (i.e., more than doubled), 1.80 ($e^{.661}$) higher at the hands of U.S. Army forces, and 1.22 ($e^{.448}$) higher at the hands of Al-Qaeda. Compared to Shia victims, the increase in expected odds of harassment for individual Sunni victims was 1.01 ($e^{.369}$). The increases in the expected

Table III. Multilevel Estimates Predicting the Log-Odds of Harassment and Threats

	Harassment	Threats	
	b(SE)	b(SE)	
Intercept	−1.086	−.141	−.387
	(.212)	(.196)	(.222)
Individuals			
Male	−.014	.241	.245
	(.157)	(.186)	(.190)
Sunni	.369*	.411*	.361
	(.179)	(.207)	(.203)
Non-Shia Others	.318	.614**	.592***
	(.250)	(.191)	(.173)
Employed	−.244*	.281	.336
	(.114)	(.183)	(.187)
Al-Qaeda	.448**	.552*	.502*
	(.169)	(.225)	(.241)
Mahdi Army	.785***	.483***	.324**
	(.157)	(.107)	(.105)
U.S. Forces	.661*	−.533*	−.705**
	(.275)	(.242)	(.229)
2006	−.031	−.095	.076
	(.162)	(.145)	(.148)
Harassment	—	—	.972***
			(.196)
Neighborhoods			
Sunni	.420***	.217	.132
	(.089)	(.343)	(.353)
Mixed	.207	.186	.152
	(.102)*	(.189)	(.183)

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

odds of harassment also were, respectively, 1.14 (e$^{.420}$) and .56 (e$^{.207}$) higher in Sunni and mixed neighborhoods than in Shia neighborhoods.

The second and third columns of Table III consider the expected odds of being threatened. The second column includes the same predictors of threats that we considered for harassment, while the third column adds harassment. The estimates reported in the second column indicate that most of the same predictors of harassment also similarly and significantly predict threats. One exception is that other non-Shia as well as Sunni individuals were significantly more likely to be threatened than Shia individuals. A second exception is that the neighborhood effects that we saw for harassment do not appear for threats. This may be because, as described above, the threats were specifically communicated in writing directly to individuals. Consistent with this speculation, the expected odds of Sunni and other non-Shias being threatened are higher in columns two than those for harassment in the first column.

In Table III, we also see that the effect of U.S. forces is now negative. U.S. forces were apparently more involved in harassment—especially by means of stops and detentions—than in threats against Iraqis. The highly significant effect of harassment reported in the third column is consistent with this variable playing the role predicted in Fig. 1 as a mediator of the Mahdi Army's victimization of the Sunni. Thus the inclusion of harassment in the third column of this table reduces the individual-level expected odds of the Mahdi Army and Sunni variables in the prediction of threats, and the effect of the Sunni variable is reduced below statistical significance.

The results in Table III generally support the involvement anticipated in Fig. 1 of the Mahdi Army in harassment aimed at Sunni individuals in Sunni and mixed neighborhoods and their displacement following threats. Our results thus corroborate the historically grounded fearful anticipation among ordinary Iraqis that Sunni and other non-Shia victims were at heightened risk of harassment and threats by Shia Mahdi Army perpetrators. The indication is that Iraqis correctly anticipated the danger of looming problems in their neighborhoods involving Shia groups like the Mahdi Army and the Sunni, as well as other non-Shia residents. Even when individual Sunnis may have evaded the neighborhood harassment of the Mahdi Army, they were still at heightened risk of threats from this militia, which in turn frequently led to the displacement that we model next.

Table IV presents the log-odds of human-rights victims in Baghdad experiencing displacement in a model that introduces neighborhood- and individual-level factors involved in the fears and ensuing displacement. This table incorporates the empirical grounding of the fearful historical anticipation of Iraqi citizens that Sunni victims were at heightened risk of harassment and threats from Shia Mahdi Army perpetrators. The key inference of the analysis presented in Table IV is that when the effects of the historical anticipation of Iraqis of dangerous, looming confrontations between Shia and Sunni groups are taken into account, any remaining net direct effect on displacement of Iraqi fears represents an amplification that compounds the effects of their historical anticipations measured in the first six months after the invasion. In other words, the prediction is that the historical anticipation

Table IV. Multilevel Estimates Predicting the Log-Odds of Displacement

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)	b (SE)
Intercept	.843 (.205)	1.245 (.240)	.830 (376)	.694 (.398)	.187 (.488)
Individuals					
Male			.215 (.199)	.238 (.206)	.164 (.227)
Sunni			.667 (.243)**	.576 (.243)**	.464 (.229)*
Non-Shia			−.054 (.173)	.451 (.271)	.268 (.297)
Employed			.502 (.252)*	−.024 (.176)	−.121 (.169)
Al-Qaeda			.094 (.344)	.038 (.359)	−.185 (.333)
Mahdi Army			.638 (.303)*	.547 (.307)	.463 (.331)
U.S. Forces			−.925 (.224)***	−1.014 (.237)***	−.814 (.270)**
2006			.237 (.156)	.248 (.158)	.281 (.188)
Killings			−.324 (.179)	−.286 (.177)	−.247 (.183)
Harassment				.651 (.195)***	.315 (.225)
Threats					1.593 (.229)***
Neighborhoods					
Sunni	.725 (.331)*	−.040 (.431)	−.051 (.419)	−.069 (.424)	−.100 (.467)
Mixed	.680 (.283)*	.332 (.271)	.273 (.356)	.304 (.383)	.246 (.467)
Killings	.874 (1.040)	.512 (1.054)	.898 (.970)	1.436 (.892)	1.023 (.776)
Fear Before Invasion	2.062 (3.033)		3.581 (2.689)	3.981 (2.241)	2.855 (2.463)
Fear Since Invasion		4.153 (1.226)**	4.863 (1.340)**	3.974 (1.207)**	3.763 (1.375)**
Harassment				3.385 (1.310)**	1.970 (1.654)
Threats					.492 (.760)

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

of conflict by ordinary Iraqis created a self-fulfilling prophecy that was activated by the threats and harassment of the Mahdi Army.

Model 1 in Table IV includes the sectarian identification of the neighborhoods as Sunni and mixed, with Shia neighborhoods as the omitted comparison, along with neighborhood-level fear before the invasion and the neighborhood measure of killings since the invasion. The expected odds of displacement in a Sunni neighborhood compared to a Shia neighborhood are approximately doubled ($e^{.725} = 2.06$, $p < .05$), and the odds of displacement in a mixed neighborhood compared to a Shia neighborhood approach this level ($e^{.680} = 1.77$, $p < .05$). There is no evidence here that fear at night *before* the invasion significantly predicts displacement.

Model 2 in Table IV removes the nonsignificant effect of fear before the invasion and replaces it with fear in the early months after the invasion. The effect of this 2003 GP measure of fear at the neighborhood level is highly significant ($\beta = 4.153$, $p < .01$) and it substantially mediates the Sunni and mixed-neighborhood effects, reducing them below statistical significance (from $\beta = .725$ to $\beta = −.040$ and from $\beta = .680$ to $\beta = .332$, respectively; both $p > .05$). Because the neighborhood-fear measure is continuous, it is useful to standardize it. Each standard deviation increase in neighborhood fear at night increases odds of displacement by 1.45 ($e^{4.153X}.09$).

Model 3 includes both the before- and after-invasion fear measures and the individual-level predictors of displacement. The before- and after-invasion fear measures are negatively correlated (i.e., Sunni neighborhoods less fearful during Saddam's regime were more fearful after the invasion), and including both measures increases the effects of both measures on displacement, although only fear *after* the invasion is statistically significant (β = 4.863, p < .01).

In addition, Model 3 reveals an increase in odds by 1.95 ($e^{.667}$) of displacement for Sunni compared to Shia respondents, while the odds of Mahdi Army compared to other forces being the perpetrator group are increased by 1.893 ($e^{.638}$). In contrast, involvement of U.S. forces reduces the odds of displacement by 61% ($1-e^{-.925}$). This latter effect remains relatively stable across remaining models in this table. This effect implies some success of U.S. forces in disrupting or reducing displacement. There are no statistically significant effects of Al-Qaeda on displacement observed in Table IV. This is consistent with our suggestion that the goal of Al-Qaeda was sustained violence between the Shia and Sunni groups rather than separation of the groups through the forced removal of either group.

Model 4 adds the mediating effects of harassment at individual and neighborhood-specific levels. Harassment has significant effects at both levels and its mediating role at the individual level reduces the effects of both Sunni victimization (β = .667 reduced to β = .576) and Mahdi army perpetration (β = .638 reduced to β = .547) by about 10%, with the latter effect reduced below statistical significance. The individual-level effect of harassment nearly doubles the odds of displacement ($e^{.651}$ = 1.92). Each standard deviation increment in neighborhood level of harassment increases the odds of displacement by 1.31 ($e^{3.385}$X.08). Neighborhood-level harassment also reduces the effect of fear after the invasion by nearly one-fifth (β = 4.863 to β = 3.974), although this effect of neighborhood specific fear remains highly significant (p < .01).

Model 5 introduces the mediating effect of threats at the individual and neighborhood levels. Recall that threats characteristically were individually delivered by Mahdi Army perpetrators in letters or written communications. This again may explain why the effect of threats is highly significant at the individual (β = 1.593, p < .001) but not at the neighborhood level. The individual-level effect of threats is the strongest in the analysis of displacement, nearly increasing the odds of displacement by a multiple of five ($e^{1.593}$ = 4.92). The mediating effect of threats reduces individual- and neighborhood-level effects of harassment below significance (respectively, from β = .651 to β = .315 [p > .05] and from β = 3.385 to β = 1.970 [p > .05]). However, although the effect of neighborhood-specific fear after the invasion is reduced somewhat (from β = 3.974 to β = 3.763), it remains highly statistically significant (β = 3.763, p < .01). This is the amplification effect above and beyond the historically anticipated effects of harassment and threats targeted at predominately Sunni neighborhoods that reflects at the neighborhood level what we have called the Mertonian self-fulfilling prophecy of fear.

Finally, Table V examines cross-level interaction effects on displacement of neighborhood fear soon after the 2003 invasion with (1) reports of actions by U.S. forces and (2) the year of the Al-Qaeda 2006 attack on the Samarra Shrine. We have trimmed the models in this table to include only variables with significant effects

Table V. Trimmed Models of Displacement With Cross-Level Interactions

|	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)
	b (SE)	*b* (SE)	*b* (SE)
Intercept	.341 (.197)	.323 (.201)	.316 (.197)
Individuals			
Sunni	.539 (.194)**	.541 (.198)***	.558 (.196)**
U.S. Forces	−.820 (.234)***	−.787 (.246)**	−.825 (.244)***
2006	.279 (.185)	.318 (.162)*	.557 (.196)**
Threats	1.793 (.199)***	1.800 (.993)*	1.809 (.197)***
Neighborhoods			
Fear After Invasion	4.288 (1.132)***	1.990 (.993)*	2.632 (1.219)*
Cross-Level Interactions			
Fear After Invasion ×U.S. Forces	−3.011 (1.607)+		−2.169 (1.717)
Fear After Invasion ×2006		4.268 (1.890)*	3.931 (1.929)*

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
$+p < .1$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

from Table IV and the year 2006 for purposes of estimating the cross-level interactions. Model 1 introduces the first cross-level interaction of fear and actions of U.S. forces and reveals a negative and marginally significant ($\beta = -3.011$, p < .10) effect. As such, U.S. forces may have had some deterrent effect in disrupting and reducing displacement in the neighborhoods with higher levels of fear.

Model 2 alternatively introduces the cross-level interaction of fear measured in 2003 and the 2006 year of the Samarra Shrine attack. This interaction effect is statistically significant ($\beta = 4.268$, p < .05) and reduces the main effect of 2003 neighborhood specific fear (from $\beta = 4.288$ to $\beta = 1.990$, p < .05). Thus, neighborhood fear measured in 2003 had its greatest impact three years later, during the panicked displacement that followed the 2006 Samarra Shrine attack.

The final Model 3 in Table V includes both of the above cross-level interactions. Although the fear and year interaction remains statistically significant ($\beta = 3.931$, p < .05), the interaction between fear and U.S. forces is reduced below statistical significance ($\beta = -2.169$, p > .05). The implication is that neighborhoods with the highest levels of fear after the 2003 invasion were the most likely to experience displacement during the 2006 Al-Qaeda attack on the Samarra Shrine, notwithstanding the efforts of the U.S. forces to stabilize these neighborhoods. The failure of the latter U.S. efforts reflects Merton's point that self-fulfilling prophecies occur in the absence of successful institutional controls.

Figure 3 gives a visual sense of the fearful neighborhood specific impact of the fear-by-year, cross-level interaction effect. We used Model 3 in Table IV to produce a graph with the significant variables in the model set at their mean effects. HLM randomly selects a specified number—in our case 15—of the neighborhoods for presentation. Each line in the graph reflects movement up and down in a specific neighborhood on the odds of displacement associated with the year 2006, in which Al-Qaeda struck the Samarra Shrine. About half the

Fig. 3. Amplified impact of the self-fulfilling prophecy of fear on displacement in Baghdad neighborhoods with varying levels of fear (2003) after the Samarra Shrine attack (2006).

neighborhoods presented are in the lower half of the distribution of fear soon after the invasion and about half are in the upper half of this distribution. The lines indicate that while most of the neighborhoods in the lower half of the fear distribution were little affected by the Samarra Shrine attack, the neighborhoods in the upper half of the fear distribution were notably more likely to experience displacement in the aftermath of the 2006 attack. We interpret this interaction effect—net of other variables including the U.S. forces—as an indication of the amplified impact of the self-fulfilling prophecy of fear in the most fearful neighborhoods following the shrine attack.

CONTEXTUALIZING FIGHT AND FLIGHT

Our findings generally confirm the involvement anticipated in Fig. 1 of the Mahdi Army in harassment and threats aimed at Sunni individuals and in Sunni and mixed neighborhoods, and leading to the forced removal of Sunni residents from their neighborhoods. Ordinary Iraqis' fears accurately anticipated the patterns that followed the invasion, which placed Sunni and other non-Shia groups at heightened risk of a process of sectarian cleansing involving the harassment and threats that led to displacement by Shia militia. Even if ordinary Iraqis' inchoate fears did not specifically anticipate the rise of the Shia-based Mahdi Army, it would have been impossible for Iraqis not to know collectively about the looming prospect of sectarian conflict, and they therefore could foresee at the level of specific neighborhoods the danger of some form of conflict that would massively and systematically disrupt Iraqi society.

We have argued that the opportunistic and coordinated "dual purpose" crimes of the Mahdi Army reflected the kinds of organized collective criminal behavior depicted in Tilly's and Cloward and Ohlin's theories. Muqtada al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army successfully applied organized criminal methods with results that changed the demography of Baghdad. The resulting displacement from Baghdad peaked in 2006, and when Muqtada staged his strategic freeze in 2007, he and his Sadrist movement began a new phase of engagement with the Iraqi state that his mass movement and criminal methods helped to shape. Our findings are thus consistent with the role Tilly argues organized criminality plays in making and remaking states.

Al-Sadr began as a nonstate actor and became the leader of a large political movement. The movement remained underground until the toppling of the Baathist regime, and it was initially largely unknown and underestimated by the United States. Muqtada built the Mahdi Army which used the organized criminal tools of harassment, threats, and protection to expand its control from Baghdad's Sadr City. Al-Sadr effectively made this impoverished slum of several million people into a city-state within Baghdad. From there, he spread his influence across eastern Baghdad, eventually entering Iraq's parliament and becoming part of the new government.

Historically based fears expressed by Iraqi citizens in the 2003 Gallup postinvasion survey correctly anticipated neighborhood specific problems between Shia groups like the Mahdi Army and the Sunni, as well as other non-Shia residents. To the extent that there was an effect of these early postinvasion neighborhood fears exceeding the indirect processes of historical anticipation, the added net direct effect of neighborhood fears can be understood as the result of expectation amplification. The predicted result was a Mertonian prophecy of fear.

The final model we estimated included a cross-level effect on displacement of the interaction of neighborhood fear soon after the 2003 invasion with the Al-Qaeda 2006 attack on the Samarra Shrine. This cross-level interaction effect was not only statistically significant but also substantially reduced the earlier observed main effect of 2003 neighborhood fear, as well as reducing below statistical significance the mitigating negative effects of U.S. forces. Thus, as predicted in our theoretical model displayed in Fig. 1, neighborhood fear measured soon after the invasion had its most significant impact three years later during the 2006 and following the Samarra Shrine attack. These results from the battle for Baghdad are persuasive confirmation for Sampson's (2012:147) thesis that "the perceptual basis of action is contingent on neighborhood context, which in turn plays a role in shaping the long-term trajectories and identities of places." As Sampson more generally suggests, knowledge of place matters.

An ironic aspect of the battle for Baghdad was that the process of displacement resembled in significant ways the "Arbization of Kirkuk" by Saddam Hussein. The tactics of harassment and threats used by Iraq government forces to dramatically change the ethnic composition of Kirkuk paralleled the Madhi Army's campaign in Baghdad. The results in Kirkuk anticipated the long-term resentments about loss of property and livelihoods that would emerge among the Sunni in Baghdad during the American occupation.

At the end of 2011, Iraq became relatively free of foreign military presence as the United States withdrew its combat forces, leaving behind reduced numbers of mainly civilian government and contract workers. While this might have signaled a new era of greater Iraqi social and political integration, Prime Minister Maliki and his government reignited sectarian tensions by reducing, rather than maintaining or increasing, Sunni representation in his government. This further aggravated a Sunni sense of victimhood, for example, by dashing hopes of redress for the loss of homes and neighborhoods. It reinforced neighborhood and community fears that were initially aggravated by the invasion and de-Baathification policies—these were now entrenched by sectarian segregation at the neighborhood and community level—straining and then breaking the tentative but unstable period of peace. The Maliki government directed Iraq Army attacks against suspected Sunni militias, prosecuted Sunni leaders, and directed police and military force to repress civilian protests in Sunni-controlled areas. These and other actions have further amplified the fears of Arab Sunnis in Iraq, leading in time especially in the northern and central parts of Iraq to the acceptance by local Sunnis of the advances and takeovers of large areas by the Islamic state (also known as ISIS or ISIL).

Much has been made in policy discussions about the unanticipated consequences of the American invasion and occupation of Iraq. The data presented in this article suggest that in the very period when the Bush administration that launched this war was celebrating the "accomplished" mission of the invasion and toppling of the Saddam Hussein Baathist regime, Iraqis in vulnerable neighborhoods were already fearfully anticipating the dangerous consequences of sectarian violence that this American invasion would unleash. We have shown that this anticipation was further amplified by a compounding self-fulfilling prophecy of fear. Merton emphasized in his writing and in his own research that self-fulfilling prophecies only occur in the context of failures of deliberate institutional controls to contain their effects. Following the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. forces failed to plan and implement an occupation that could institutionally contain the self-fulfilling fear and panic that it not only did not anticipate but also preemptively acted to provoke.

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